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WVEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

quoted, but Judge Miller beyond a doubt gave to it the interpretation hereinbefore stated as the correct one. He says:
"This construction may not necessarily work a repeal of seetion 38. It may perhaps still be applied with its full force to
the other provisions of section 34; but this question is not presented and we do not decide it."
Perhaps the dictum in Leiter v. American-La France FireEngineCo. either is inadvertent or else was based, without full consideration, upon the ambiguous syllabus of Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder.
-L. C.
FORFEITURE OF OIL AND GAS LEASE FOp BREACH OF COVENANT.-

The Supreme Court of Kansas recently has affirmed a judgment
canceling an oil and gas lease for breach of an express covenant to
complete a well on the premises within sixty days.' The lease in
question was for a term of one year and as long thereafter as oil
or gas should be produced or operations continued. The lessees
covenanted "to complete a well on satd premises within sixty (60)
days from the date hereof, or in case of a failure to complete a
well Within the time above specified, to pay to the first parties
fifteen dollars ($15) in advance for each additional month such
completion is unavoidably delayed from the time above mentioned for the completion of such well, until the well is completed
or this contract is surrendered, as is hereinafter provided; . . ."
The lessees did not begin a well within sixty days from the date of
the lease. Two days after the expiration of the sixty day period
the lessor served notice on the lessees that the lease was forfeited
for failure of the lessees to perform the covenants and conditions.
therein. Suit was then started to cancel the lease. The trial
court found that the lessees had made no effort to develop the
premises within sixty days, and that this failure to do so was not
the result of unavoidable delays. The court held that the proper
construction of the covenant was that the lessees were bound to
complete a well within sixty days, except that its completion might
be deferred in case there was unavoidable delay, and that by reason of the omission and neglect of the defendants to keep and
perform this covenant they had forfeited their rights. Judgment
was entered canceling and setting aside the lease. The Supreme
Court affirmed this judgment on the sole ground that the defend'

Waters v. Hatfield, 190 Pae. 599 (Kan. 1920).
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ants had made a breach of their covenant to complete a well within sixty days, the court stating its conclusion as follows: "It
was an express covenant that formed a part of the consideration
for the granting of the lease, its -violation warranted the judgment
canceling the lease, and it follows that the judgment must be
affirmed." Is there any ground upon which the judgment can be
sustained?
An ordinary lease cannot be forfeited for a mere breach of
covenant.2 The same rule has been quite consistently applied to
oil and gas leases though they are not true leases but create profits
a prendre.3 In the case of ordinary leases in the absence of statutory provisions a forfeiture usually can be declared only for
breach of an express condition. In the case of oil and gas leases
a forfeiture may also be declared for breach of an implied condition. Two of the situations under which a court will sometimes
imply a condition in an oil and gas lease may be apropos to this
note. First, where there is no express provision in an oil and gas
lease as to how or when the lessee is to drill for oil and gas on the
premises, it is said that there is an implied covenant that he is to
prospect for oil and gas with reasonable diligence and also an
implied condition that if he fails to perform this duty, the lessor
may forfeit the lease.' The courts say that considering the instrument as a whole, it appears that the primary purpose of the
lessor in entering into the lease was to have the premises prospected for oil and gas and if these minerals were found, to have
them produced so that he would realize the royalties therefrom.
Hence it is inequitable to permit the lessee to hold the lease without prospecting for oil and gas and so to defeat this primary purpose. Consequently, the condition is implied as above stated."
Second, if at any time during the continuance of the lease, wells
are drilled on neighboring lands near the boundaries of the premises so as to drain or threaten to drain oil and gas therefrom, it
is held it is the implied duty of the lessee to drill offset wells to
prevent such drainage, and if he fails in the performance of this
duty, the lessor may declare a forfeiture.6 It is said the intent of
the parties was to produce the oil and gas from the premises
= See TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1364.
8 Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 108 Pac. 813 (1910).
See
25 W. VA. L. QUAR. 311-325.
' Gadbury i. Indiana Consolidated Gas Co., 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259
(1903);
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801 (1905) ; Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., 68
w. Va. 667, 70 S. E. 708 (1911).
Note 45, supra.
6 Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. St. 502, 35 Atl. 109 (1896).
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and not to allow it to be lost by drainage through adjoining lands,
consequently the lessee cannot hold the lease without protecting
the boundaries to the irrevocable damage of the lessor.7 Whether
on principle it is proper to imply the above conditions in oil and
gas leases is not under consideration. The fact is, such conditions are sometimes implied.
Can the judgment in the principal case be justified either on
the ground there was an implied condition, that if the lessees
failed to develop the premises for oil and gas by drilling a well
within sixty days, the lease might be forfeited for breach of this
condition, or on the ground that there was an implied condition in
the lease that the lessor might forfeit if the lessees failed to protect
the premises from drainage?' The objection that the judgment in
the case would be a decree in aid of a forfeiture may be disregarded. While it has been said that a court of equity will never
enter a decree in aid of a forfeiture, 8 the fact is that in controversies arising out of oil and gas leases a court of equity will and
sometimes does enter a decree in aid of a forfeiture.9
In the principal case the duty of the lessees to prospect for oil
and gas is set out in the express covenant, consequently, if there
is an implied condition as to development, it must be a condition
that if the lessees fail to perform their covenant to complete a well
within sixty days, unavoidable delays excepted, the lessor may forfeit the lease. It would certainly not be reasonable to imply a
condition requiring the lessee to prospect for oil and gas with reasonable diligence where there is such a covenant. Had the word
"unavoidably" been omitted from the covenant, then there could
be no implied condition whatever because the lessees would have
had the option, by the express terms of the instrument, of completing a well or paying fifteen dollars per month for each month
such completion was delayed.10 But as the covenant in question
was construed by the court there is no express provision in the
lease squarely inconsistent with the implication of the condition
7 Perhaps it is accurate to say there are two distinct Implied conditions.

It is

probably in fact only one condltion, i. e., that the lessor may forfeit If the lessee
fails to perform his duty to prospect for and produce oil and gas with reasonable
The fact that there is drainage perhaps is only an element bearing oil
diligence.

the question as to what is reasonable diligence.
supra, and also note in 34 L. R. A. N. S. 34.

See cases cited in notes 4 and 6

See POWEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 4 ed., §§ 459, 460.
9 Many cases which discuss the subject are collected in the notes In 28 L.
s

R. A. N.

S. 959; 34 Ia R. A. D. S. 34; 38 L. R. A. N. S. 134.
10 Kachelmacher v. Laird, 92 Oh. St. 24, 110 N. E. 933 (1915) ; Greek V. Wylie,
109 AtI. 529 (Pa. 1920) : Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 432, 19. S. E.
12 (1916) ; Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra.
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suggested above. It is submitted that whatever justification there
may be for implying such a condition in the case of a lease for a
term of several years, there is none in the principal case where the
term was for one year only and-the lessees were required by the
terms thereof to complete a well before the end of that year. The
land would be free from the lease in the course of one year unless
at least one well was completed and could then be leased to some
one else. The lessor had received the sum of $520 for the lease
(more than the usual annual royalty on a gas well) and since a
well was not completed within sixty days, he could have recovered
damages in an action at law for breach of the covenant." If the
royalty provided in the lease was, as is customary, an annual sum
of a few hundred dollars--a point as to which the opinion of the
court is silent-then the damages for the breach of this covenant
could not exceed the annual sum to be paid for one gas well for
one year, at most a few hundred dollars. Where the damages to
the lessor are necessarily so insignificant, it is submitted that acourt ought not to resort to such a drastic action as to imply such
a condition and then enter a decree in aid thereof.
If we decide that the covenant to complete a well within sixty
days cannot be made a condition by implication, the question then
arises as to whether there can be an implied condition as to drainage. While the implication of such a condition may seem rather
unusual yet, where the land is under lease for a term of years by
the terms of which the lessee is not bound to develop during said
term, the oil or gas may be partially or wholly drained from beneath the premises through wells on neighboring land, and thus
entirely lost to the lessor. Since the lessor usually gets only a
small rental during the time the development is delayed, he thus
suffers irreparable injury. Consequently, there is a strong practical
reason for giving relief to the lessor in such case, and this has been
accomplished through the implication of a condition. In the principal case it appeared that the premises were in an extensive gas
field and there was a very large gas well within three hundred
feet of the premises and another within a quarter of a mile. Hence
there probably was some drainage of gas occurring. In order to
have complied with such an implied condition the lessees would
probably have been compelled to drill one well to offset the neara' Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., supra. This case held that the lessor, before he could have a decree canceling the lease, must show affirmatively that he has
no adequate remedy at law. The principal case seems to disregard this prior decision.
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est gas well. As they did not do so, if drainage were proved, the
lessor's damages could not exceed the amount of the royalty on
one gas well for one year, or a few hundred dollars. Here again,
it appears that the damages to the lessor were very small and that
bhe might have recovered damages in an action at law. By allowing a forfeiture the lessees lost what must have been a very valuable leasehold for which they had paid a cash consideration of five
hundred and twenty dollars.
Under such circumstances the court ought not to announce a
new rule of law which has the effect of destroying a valuable lease
to the great damage of the lessees and the very great enrichment
2
of the lessor.'
It is t6 be regretted that such uncertainties as we find here
are still injected into the law governing oil and gas leases which is
already badly confused. In deciding such a controversy between
two parties it is even more important to follow established legal
principles than to do justice between the parties to the particular
suit because all other persons in the state having interests of like
nature must govern themselves by the law derived from such principles. Such sudden departures, which cannot be anticipated even
by skilled lawyers, are disastrous. It is submitted that the judgfnent in the principal case is not in accordance with law 3 and has
not even the merit of being equitable as between the parties.
-J. W. S.
12 It might be suggested that the so-called lease amounted to a mere personal contract and the lessees had made a substantial breach and therefore the lessor had a
right to rescind. The logical result of this would be that the oil and gas lease passed
to the lessees no right in the land. This, it is submitted, is not a defensible position though dicta can be found in the Kansas decision which tend to support it.
However, the law of the state seems to be that such a lease creates an incorporeal
hereditament. See 18 MIcH. L. REv. 765, and cases there cited.
13 No provision in the Kansas statutes has been found which authorizes forfeiture
for breach of such a covenant.
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